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Introduction 
Mexico's recent oil discoveries together with 
expanded production levels of hydrocarbons have 
and will continue to have several important 
impacts on Mexico: Cl> it has provided the 
country with the means to fundamentally change 
the status quo between itself and the United 
States; C 2) Mexico's economic power was sud-
denly increased, but its vulnerability also 
rapidly increased as the government became 
accustomed to a larger source of revenues; C 3) 
the interdependence between the government, the 
private sector and various groups within the 
country became more unstable in both the politi-
cal and economic senses as frictions developed 
between these groups, and C 4 l because of ( 1 l 
through C3l, the government sought a development 
strategy that would enable it to achieve a 
viable interdependence between internal groups 
and between itself and the United States. 
Several possible strategies were both logical 
and feasible: 
1. a rapid increase in the production of 
crude oil; 
2. expanded crude oil production, but based 
largely on domestic needs; 
3. a policy of diversified industrialization; 
4. a policy mix consisting of moderate 
industrialization and development of ser-
vice sectors - government employment, and 
5. a high growth strategy of petroleum based 
industrialization combined with high and 
steady levels of oil exports. 
Each of these strategies has certain advantages 
and disadvantages. Clearly, the strategy of 
expanding the production and export of crude 
would increase revenues; but at the same time it 
would also increase the country's external 
vulnerability and risk, increasing internal 
friction between the government and various 
conservationist-nationalistic groups. Likewise, 
a stabilization of output levels f.or domestic 
needs and supplemental foreign exchange earnings 
would minimize dislocations and inflationary 
pressures, but would not permit the government 
to address the country's growing unemployment 
problem. 
Ultimately, of course, the country adopted the 
Industrial Development Plan with its orientation 
towards some sort of viable interdependencies 
between the U .s. and Mexico together with its 
implicit compromise between nationalistic and 
high growth oriented domestic groups. Viable 
interdependence whereby domestic investment of 
oil revenues in heavy industries (made possible 
26 
by high levels of export J was seen as the best 
means of achieving some sort of balance between 
efficiency and vulnerability.2 Through govern-
ment investment of oil revenues, the authorities 
sought structural change capable of: C 1 l in-
creasing the ability of the country to utilize 
more of its oil and gas resources domestically 
(so that the country's dependence on hydrocarbon 
exports could be curtailed; C2l increasing the 
country's ability to produce the trade products 
derived from hydrocarbons; ( 3 l enabling the 
country to trade and bargain on relatively equal 
technological and economic ground, and C4l 
making the country less vulnerable to the 
effects of severe market fluctuations or sudden 
changes in the politics and trade policies of 
the U.S. and other developed countries. 
United States-Mexican Relations 
The forecasts in the previous chapter have a 
number of implications for the United States. 
U.S. energy difficulties have more or less coin-
cided with: C 1 l the large oil discoveries in 
Mexico, ( 2) sharply rising Mexican exports of 
other products, e.g. agricultural items to the 
United States, and C3l an awareness that 
approximately six million Mexicans are living in 
the United States, many of them illegally. 
It is clear from the forecasts and in light of 
C 2 l and C 3 l above that the scope for Mexican 
discretionary action in oil production and 
export rates is rather limited, particularly in 
terms of the recent fall in oil prices. The 
forecasts indicate that it will take increases 
in crude oil production rates of at least 10 
percent per annum through the 1980s and into the 
1990s if Mexico is to create the number of jobs 
sufficient to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the need for Mexicans to migrate to the United 
States in search of work. 
Mutual interest over the long term is thus 
likely to bring an increase of pragmatism in 
Mexican/U.S. relations with an eventual reduc-
tion in dogmatism on the Mexican side, though 
this will presumably be provided by the poli ti-
cians as long as their domestic audiences 
require it. 
Present Mexican policy appears committed to 
maintain existing Mexican markets in the United 
States and open up new ones. Faced with the 
benefits of this increased exchange in terms of 
industrial and agricultural employment, any 
future Mexican government would have to consider 
carefully the implications of embarking on poli-
cies which might prove damaging to U.S. 
interests. 
As oil wealth brings average Mexican income 
levels closer to those of the United States, 
pressures to migrate from Mexico to the United 
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States should lessen. By that time the Mexican 
American community in the United States will 
have become that much larger, wealthier, more 
respected and a more permanent feature of U.S. 
life. These tendencies cannot but more closely 
link the two countries and increase their mutual 
interests. 
However, despite movements towards closer iden-
tity of interests , it would be erroneous for 
Americans to believe that increased wealth will 
make the Mexicans more "reasonable." They wi 11 
continue to wish to preserve and develop their 
own very distinct traditions and institutions, 
many of which they consider superior to those of 
the United States. 
Potential Development Problems 
While the Mexican Industrial Development Plan 
envisions a growth in gross domestic product of 
ten percent between 1978 and 1980, it is still 
true that: 
1. the country is becoming more and more 
dependent on oil exports and in the impact 
of these oil revenues on the domestic 
economy; 
2. the strategy is largely a resource based, 
capital intensive process of industriali-
zation, with agriculture playing a largely 
passive role of maintaining structural 
balance, and the non-economic one of 
insuring some level of food self-reliance; 
3. the strategy requires careful preplanning 
and identification of profitable invest-
ments (particularly since the break with 
past patterns of ·growth has been so 
radical); 
4. the stragegy has been deficient in 
assessing realistically the manpower and 
education requirements of such industries; 
5. little attention has been given to the 
identification of operational means of 
shifting from essentially an import 
substitution development strategy to one 
more viable in terms of the country's com-
parative advantage. 
There are several problems that are pq,tentially 
serious enough to warrant government action. It 
is difficult to prioritize these difficulties in 
terms of relative importance for concern. A 
tentative ranking based on factors discussed in 
the previous chapters would be: Cl) a worsening 
of the world food situation; ( 2) deterioration 
of the income distribution; ( 3 > sector uncer-
tainty as to the role of the government in the 
economy, and (4) those problems requiring 
reforms in planning procedures. 
These factors are capable of creating a number 
of potential problems which if left unattended 
could undermine the country's whole development 
effort. 
Worsening of the World Food Situation 
The world food situation will continue to 
deteriorate over the next 20 years as population 
pressures begin to make themselves felt and the 
amount of usable land per capita declines.3 
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While existing technology should be able to off-
set this trend, the inability of many developing 
countries to implement productivity increases 
(largely because of political reasons) will mean 
lagging output. The result will be increases in 
scarcity, food, even if available, will sell for 
much higher prices causing Mexico's balance of 
payments to deteriorate drastically. 
Agriculture is surely the weak link in any chain 
of integrated development policies in Mexico. 
The Industrial Development Plan itself points 
out that a doubling of public investment in the 
sector between 1977 and 1982 will barely arrest 
the decline in agricultural output, and if that 
output grows no faster than the 3 percent mini-
mum rate projected in the plan, food imports 
will require 21 percent of petroleum export 
revenues in 1982 and 54 percent in 19904. 
Facing increased food imports and declining 
agricultural growth, Mexico can pursue one of 
two options. It can finance necessary food 
imports out of export revenues and take a chance 
that the world food situation will not deteri-
oriate, or it can redirect food crop production 
and processing to better serve domestic needs. 
The first path leads to increased food depen-
dency and the second to increased food self-
reliance. Both paths will influence the long 
term structure of the Mexican economy and its 
comparative advantage in the world market. 
In a major effort at modeling the overall 
Mexican agricultural sector, Goreoux and Mannes 
identify the slow growth of demand <domestic and 
export) and a serious constraint of agricultural 
growth contributing to low rural incomes and 
adverse changes in the agricultural terms of 
trade. Rural incomes could be increased by 
higher support process, administered by 
Conasupo, at the cost of the welfare of the con-
sumers and growing food stockpiles, unless 
Conasupo also subsidized domestic sales which it 
does. Such funding is not offset by tax reve-
nues. It would, however, contribute to infla-
tion. Oil as a source of foreign exchange 
offers the option, but increased dependence and 
vulnerability toward price movements.6 
Given the possibility of a dismal worldwide agri-
culture performance and the seriousness of the 
problem, several more direct actions should be 
undertaken. These include:? 
1. improving the productivity of traditional 
agriculture. This will require a much 
higher level of support services and 
easier access to financial aid. Policies 
along these lines could substantially 
increase the production of corn and beans 
in the higher rainfall areas (where most 
of the traditional agriculture is 
located), 
2. bringing more land under cultivation, par-
ticularly in the southeast which possesses 
water resources but is under populated, 
and 
3. improving transportation. 
The government appears to be moving in these 
directions. In April 1980, it announced a whole 
series of new measures directed t~wards the 
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improvement of agriculture within the context of 
the Plan Global de Desarrollo 1980-82 and under 
the Mexican Food System. Some of the measures 
included under these plans are:8 
1. encouragement of producers' cooperatives 
for the sale of produce and the purchasing 
of materials; 
2. increases in research and development di-
rected toward rain dependent agriculture; 
3. improvement of water resources infrastruc-
ture in rain dependent areas; 
4. concentration of cattle breeding in order 
to bring more grazing land under culti-
vation; 
5. promotion of colonization of new agri-
cultural areas, and 
6. improved credit and insurance facilities 
for producers of essential commodities. 
These measures seem long overdue. They are in a 
large part directed towards areas where rainfall 
is adequate, where the poorest traditional far-
mers work the land, and to regions to be opened 
up for futher development. 
These measul!es are designed to raise the rate of 
growth of agricultural production to 4.1 percent 
in real terms by 1982 Cat which point self-
sufficiency in maize and beans would be as-
sured). Self-sufficiency in rice, wheat, 
sesame, soybeans and sorghum is sought by 1985. 
To achieve these objectives, it is planned to 
increase government investment connected with 
agriculture over 20 percent per annum in real 
terms during the period. The total expenditure 
earmarked for agricultural development in 1980 
as a result of these plans approaches u. S. $6 
billion. This compares with a total investment 
in the sector of around U.S. $1 billion in the 
mid-1970s.9 
Despite the encouraging directions of these 
changes, considerable organizational dif-
ficulties are developing, not the least of which 
is corruption at the local level and mistrust of 
administrators of the program by the traditional 
farming community. Despite these reservations, 
a significant increase in the resoutces reaching 
the farmers is to be expected and with this, 
corresponding increases in output and produc-
tivity should come, if not by the target dates, 
at least by 1990. 
Deterioration in Income Distribution 
There is evidence that in Mexico (as with many 
other developing countries) rapid growth is 
resulting in a worsening of the already highly 
unequal distribution of income.IO Unless action 
is taken soon, the deterioration may become even 
more severe in the 1980s as industrialization 
speeds up. As is typically the case in 
countries at this stage of development, gaps are 
appearing between various income groups and 
regions in the country as well as between the 
country's urban and rural population.11 
The main problems preventing a better distribu-
tion of wealth appear to be: 
?8 
1. inability of the rural sector to generate 
sufficient wealth for its population, and 
2. excessive concentration of population in 
the largest cities making it difficult to 
provide adequate levels of services and to 
satisfy aspirations, particularly of the 
lowest earning categories. 
Whether these shortcomings are likely to be 
solved by the implementation of the government's 
policy in relation to urban and industrial deve-
lopment of the government's policy in relation 
to urban and industrial development (which aims 
at spreading growth more evenly round the 
country) is certainly problematical. Other 
moves such as the Mexican Food System and the 
intention to provide a higher proportion of 
agricultural workers with regular wages appear 
more promising, at least in the near term. 
There is no reason why a conflict between equity 
and efficienty has to arisel2 even though in its 
eagerness to promote growth the government has 
tended to allocate oil revenues to capital 
intensive industrial development capable of 
creating Cat least directly) only a limited 
number of jobs. These investments have pre-
vailed at the expense of more potentially labor 
intensive investments located in the more popu-
lus areas. While it is clear that it is highly 
inefficient to completely .counter the forces of 
economic efficiency solely on the basis of 
social efficiency criteria, it is clear in light 
of the Iranian experience that a balance must 
soon be struck on both human and political 
grounds so as to prevent a disruption of the 
social fabric. 
In this regard Mexico is somewhat fortunate that 
by developing at a later point in time Mexico 
can avoid many of these mistakes made by Iran. 
There is no question that a major lesson to be 
learned from Iran's development strategy is that 
even though the level of income for most of the 
population may be increasing fairly rapidly, 
discontent is likely to arise if the gap between 
regions or urban/rural or even particular groups 
continues to widen.13 Adverse income distribu-
tional patterns of this sort ordinarily will not 
cause a problem if corrected fairly early. 
Increasing income disparity can, however, cause 
mass alienation as in the case of Iran. This is 
most likely to occur during periods such as the 
present when expectations of future living stan-
dards are accelerating (because of the knowledge 
of and the accumulation of that wealth in rela-
tively few hands). 
Income distribution considerations translate 
themselves into the setting of targets to mini-
mize the urban/rural income gap and the achiev-
ment of better interregional balances. Invest-
ments along these lines can be easily justified 
given the potential social strains associated 
with the kingdom's present strategy. This 
conclusion holds even though the resulting 
investment pattern might reduce the country's 
overall economic growth potential. 
Role of the Government 
In order to implement efficiently its long run 
development strategy, it will be necessary for 
the authorities to define more precisely than 
they have so far the role of government in the 
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economy. To be sure, the existence of a large 
influx of oil based revenues implies an in-
creasing role for the public sector. On the 
other hand, it is not clear what will happen 
when the oil revenues level off (perhaps as 
early as 1990). Unless there is some sort of 
tax reform, the role of the public sector may 
have to decrease rapidly relative to that of the 
private sec tor. 
The forecasts of the previous chapter indicate, 
however, that the private sector may not be in a 
position to generate the type of demand needed 
to maintain the growth rates capable of being 
attained in the country. This is particularly 
true of private investment whose rate of growth 
was positively affected by government investment 
in the forecasts. 
In principle, therefore, while the government's 
intention of encouraging the private sector to 
assume wide responsibility for production is a 
wise one, given the inefficiencies usually asso-
ciated with public sector involvement, reduction 
of goverment activities should not proceed too 
rapidly. There is a real risk of deflation if 
the government contracts its investment too 
rapidly. This problem is reinforced by the 
apparent accelerator mechanism underlying pri-
vate investments, i.e. a reduction in the rate 
of growth would have a compound contracting 
effect on private investment. 
While it is clear, therefore, that the 
government's overall industrial development 
strategy is a sound way of spending the oil 
revenues, this strategy must eventually rest on 
the abilities and dynamism of the priviate sec-
tor. The government must, therefore, clearly 
convey to the private sector that its continued 
activity in the economy is necessary for stabi-
lization purposes. Otherwise, there may be a 
number of misunderstandings over the true scope 
of the government's economic involvement that 
would cause the private sector to be even more 
reluctant than it has been at times in the past 
when uncertainty over its role was present to 
undertake investments in manufacturing. 
In any case the government 1:1hould have little 
trouble in finding areas to spend money in 
directing the path of the economy toward the 
creation of a normal balance with the private 
sector. These include: 
1. Investing in health and education 
necessary to maintain and increase the 
human element in the development process 
<while at the same time contributing to 
improvements in labor and managerial 
quality). 
2. Participating initially in heavy 
industries where the private sector may be 
reluctant to venture. 
3. Subsidizing regional investments in back-
ward areas to mold the future spatial con-
figuration of population and economic 
activity in a manner more compatible with 
existing socio-cultural factors. 
Planning Reforms 
There is a great need to 




to fill the 
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current gap in decision making that exists not 
only between the various ministries in Mexico 
City, but also between the decision makers in 
the capital and those in the provinces. Again, 
the Iranian experience illustrates the ramifica-
tions of over-centralized decision making. 
Thus, qualified individuals at the regional and 
city level presumably well acquainted with local 
problems must be drawn·into the decision making 
process to an extent much greater than has been 
the case in the past. 
The major institutional problems in this area 
which need to be examined by the authorities 
include: (1) the scope and capability of the 
planning system; (2) the implementation of 
decentralization policies involving decisions 
designed to increase participation of more indi-
viduals in the development process, and (3) the 
necessity of administrative reforms. 
In view of the very high goals set for Mexico's 
social and economic system over the longer term, 
and the pressures associated with reaching these 
goals, it is clear that not only private sector 
efficiency, but also increases in public sector 
efficiency are of paramount importance. Despite 
some recent reforms along these lines, the 
country's overly bureaucratic planning proce-
dures must be streamlined in order to reduce the 
time delays involved in project identification 
and the subsequent awarding of contracts. Re-
forms should also help reduce the duplication 
of effort and the numerous cost overruns that 
currently characterize the Mexican development 
effort. Better coordination of expenditure 
plans between ministries would also help 
<through stricter budgetary control l to reduce 
inflationary pressures. 
The question of reforming the public administra-
tive apparatus is an efficiency question which 
needs to be examined on a longer term basis. 
Eliminating red tape is important as a comple-
mentary factor in the strategy of development 
outlined above, especially with respect to 
creating private sector enthusiam and dynamism. 
Within the public sector, there should also be a 
reform in the incentive system for public 
employees. If the government is forced to 
increase its scope in the economy of activity 
due to the natural conservatism of the private 
sector, then it must be able to attract and 
retain highly qualified managers. Clearly, for 
the government to expand its capability in the 
economy, it must revise its incentive system to 
reward individuals more on the basis of ability 
and performance. 
Conclusions 
Based on the above considerations and recent 
trends in the economy and taking into account 
the experience of other oil exporting countries, 
it is likely that;lS 
1. Despite recent political difficulties with 
the United States, Mexico will increase 
its crude oil and natural gas exports to 
this country as the most readily 
accessible market. The ease of making 
delivery and the high costs of processing 
gas and shipping oil to other markets will 
make contractural agreements mutually 
attractive, and balance of payments 
considerations will also encourage exports 
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to the United States. The Mexican govern-
ment's desire to eliminate the vestiges of 
the 1976 crisis and the evident expansion-
ist leadership of PEMEX reinforce a ten-
dency to accelerate petroleum production 
despite lingering efforts by some groups 
to return to a conservationist policy. 
2. Unless measures are taken, the increased 
foreign exchange flow into Mexico will 
continue to create strong inflationary 
pressures. Although Mexican economists 
are well aware of the problem, the exper-
ience of other oil exporting countries in 
handling such difficulties has been been 
particularly encouraging. 
Leopoldo Solis, subdirector general of the Banco 
de Mexico, has noted:l6 
Two dilemmas are apparent. Firstly, the 
petroleum income has a huge inflationary 
potential, which would jeopardize Mexico's 
import substitution policy and the creation of 
jobs through it. Therefore, aggregate demand 
should be tempered by controlling PEMEX's 
expenditures. And, since not all of the 
petroleum income may be spent, because of its 
inflationary pressure, it will be necessary to 
increase the price of oil and derivatives sold 
domestically to complement this frozen income. 
The second dilemma also proceeds from the 
inflationary pressure of petroleum income 
which would cause a deterioration of the 
exchange rate of the Mexican peso. This, in 
turn, would reflect unfavorably on Mexico's 
import substitution policy, its capa-capacity 
to export, and therefore diversify production 
and employment. The example of Iran is 
evident: petroleum has provoked a decline in 
the production of Persian carpets, which 
require a large amount of labor and a 
favorable exchange rate. 
While overall Mexico's economic future seems 
assured, the Iranian experience has demonstrated 
how fragile oil-based economies really are. A 
charting of the country's likely growth path is 
quite pretentious and should only be done in the 
context of the caveats discussed above (plus, of 
course, all the political, social and military 
ones so often seen in the popular press). 
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